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_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In this case we are asked to decide whether the 
disclosure of a consumer’s account number on the face of a 
debt collector’s envelope violates § 1692f(8) of the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et 
seq.  Section 1692f(8) limits the language and symbols that a 
debt collector may place on envelopes it sends to consumers.  
The District Court held the account number met a “benign 
language” exception to § 1692f(8) and granted summary 
judgment to the debt collector.  We will vacate and remand.
1
 
 
I. 
 On May 16, 2011, Plaintiff Courtney Douglass 
received a debt collection letter from Convergent Outsourcing 
(“Convergent”) regarding the collection of a debt that 
Douglass allegedly owed T-Mobile USA.  Visible on the face 
of the letter, above Douglass’s name and address, was the 
following sequence of numbers representing Douglass’s 
account number with Convergent: “R-xxxx-5459-R241.”  
This number does not refer or relate to her account with T-
Mobile USA.  Convergent mailed the letter in an envelope 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  
Our jurisdiction is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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with a glassine window.  When mailed, the top portion of the 
letter, including Douglass’s account number, was visible 
through the window. Also visible through the window was 
Douglass’s name and address, a United States Postal Service 
bar code, and a quick response (“QR”) code, which, when 
scanned by a device such as a smart phone, revealed the same 
information as that displayed through the glassine window, as 
well as a monetary amount corresponding to Douglass’s 
alleged debt. 
 
 This action was filed in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
2
  The 
complaint was amended to add Douglass as the sole named 
plaintiff, as well as to initiate a putative class action on behalf 
of residents of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, who 
received similar letters from Convergent exposing their 
account numbers.  The operative Second Amended Complaint 
alleges when Convergent disclosed Douglass’s account 
number, both on the face of the envelope and embedded in 
the QR code, it violated § 1692f(8) of the FDCPA, which 
prohibits “using any language or symbol” other than a debt 
collector’s name and address on an envelope.  15 U.S.C.  
§ 1692f(8).  Convergent moved for summary judgment under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, contending the account number qualified 
as “benign language” that § 1692f(8) was not meant to 
prohibit.  
 
 The District Court granted summary judgment to 
                                              
2
 Another recipient of a debt collection letter from 
Convergent, Elisa Brooks-Cunningham, initially filed the 
complaint.  Brooks-Cunningham is no longer a party to this 
action. 
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Convergent.  The court reasoned that a strict interpretation of 
§ 1692f(8) would contradict Congress’s true intent, aimed at 
barring markings on an envelope that would reveal the letter 
to pertain to debt collection or harass or humiliate a 
consumer.  Accordingly, the court adopted a benign language 
exception to the statute, limiting § 1692f(8)’s reach to 
language or symbols that either  
(1) signal the letter’s purpose of debt collection or (2) tend to 
humiliate, threaten, or manipulate the recipient of the letter.  
The court concluded the account number qualified as benign 
language because it neither indicated the purpose of the letter 
nor threatened, harmed, or manipulated Douglass.  This 
timely appeal followed.
3
 
 
II. 
 On appeal, Douglass contends the language of § 
1692f(8) is unambiguous and plainly applies to Convergent’s 
disclosure of her account number on the face of the 
envelope.
4
  Convergent maintains that to enforce the plain 
meaning of § 1692f(8) would lead to absurd results and the 
                                              
3
 We exercise plenary review of an order granting a motion 
for summary judgment and apply the same standard the 
District Court applied.  Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. 
Kay, P.C., 650 F.3d 993, 996 (3d Cir. 2011).  Summary 
judgment may be granted only where “there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).   
4
 Douglass no longer presses her argument that Convergent 
violated the FDCPA by including the QR Code on the 
envelope.  Appellant Br. 5 n.2.  We therefore do not decide 
that issue. 
6 
 
statute must be read to allow for certain benign language, 
including account numbers, on the face of the envelope.  In 
reply, Douglass insists that even if § 1692f(8) included an 
exception for benign language, her account number with 
Convergent is not benign.  We agree with Douglass that § 
1692f(8) applies to this set of facts and her account number is 
not benign. 
 
 Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1977 “to eliminate 
abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure 
that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt 
collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and 
to promote consistent State action to protect consumers 
against debt collection abuses.”  15 U.S.C.  
§ 1692(e).  These abusive debt collection practices, Congress 
found, lead to personal bankruptcies, marital instability, the 
loss of jobs, and, relevant to our analysis, “invasions of 
individual privacy.”  Id. § 1692(a).  “As remedial legislation, 
the FDCPA must be broadly construed in order to give full 
effect to these purposes.”  Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue 
Recovery Grp., LLC, 709 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 
 To further the FDCPA’s purposes, § 1692f prohibits a 
debt collector from using “unfair or unconscionable means” 
to collect a debt.  15 U.S.C. § 1692f.  The statute sets out a 
nonexclusive list of conduct that qualifies as unfair or 
unconscionable.  Id.  Subparagraph 8, the focus of this appeal, 
prohibits the following conduct: 
 
[u]sing any language or symbol, other than the 
debt collector’s  address, on any envelope 
when communicating with a consumer by use 
of the mails or by telegram, except that a debt 
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collector may use  his business  name if such 
name does not indicate that he is in the debt 
collection business. 
Id. § 1692f(8).   
 This case requires us to determine whether § 1692f(8) 
prohibits Convergent’s disclosure of Douglass’s account 
number.  In statutory interpretation, we begin with the text.  
Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364, 367 
(3d Cir. 2011).  “If the statute’s plain language is 
unambiguous and expresses [Congress’s] intent with 
sufficient precision, we need not look further.”  Id. (citing In 
re Lord Abbett Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 553 F.3d 248, 254 (3d 
Cir. 2009)).  But if the “literal application of a statute will 
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of 
its drafters,” then we are obligated to “construe statutes 
sensibly and avoid constructions which yield absurd or unjust 
results.”  United States v. Fontaine, 697 F.3d 221, 227 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  
Where the plain meaning of a statute would lead to an absurd 
result, we presume “the legislature intended exceptions to its 
language [that] would avoid results of this character.”  Gov’t 
of Virgin Islands v. Berry, 604 F.2d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(quoting United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 487 
(1868)).    
 
 As a threshold matter, we conclude that § 1692f(8)’s 
prohibition on language and symbols applies to markings that 
are visible through a transparent window of an envelope.  
Section 1692f(8) regulates language “on any envelope.”  15 
U.S.C. § 1692f(8) (emphasis added).  In this case, the alleged 
violation involves language printed on the letter itself that 
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appeared through the glassine window of the envelope.  
Interpreting § 1692f(8) in accordance with its plain meaning, 
we construe language “on any envelope” to mean language 
appearing on the face of an envelope.  The statute’s context 
further confirms this construction.  Section 1692f evinces 
Congress’s intent to screen from public view information 
pertinent to the debt collection.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(7) 
(prohibiting correspondence by post card); id. § 1692f(8) 
(permitting a debt collector’s business name to appear on an 
envelope only if “such name does not indicate that he is in the 
debt collection business”).  Like language printed on the 
envelope itself, language appearing through a windowed 
envelope can be seen by anyone handling the mail.  And 
Convergent makes no argument to the contrary.  Accordingly, 
we hold § 1692f(8) applies to language visible through a 
transparent window of an envelope.     
 
 Having concluded that § 1692f(8) applies in general to 
the facts before us, we address whether Convergent’s 
disclosure of Douglass’s account number violates the 
FDCPA.  We find it does.   
 
 To prevail on an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must prove 
that (1) she is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt 
collector, (3) the defendant’s challenged practice involves an 
attempt to collect a “debt” as the Act defines it, and (4) the 
defendant has violated a provision of the FDCPA in 
attempting to collect the debt.  See, e.g., Piper v. Portnoff 
Law Assocs., Ltd., 396 F.3d 227, 232 (3d Cir. 2005).  The 
only element at issue in this case is the fourth—whether 
Convergent has violated § 1692f(8) of the FDCPA. 
 
 The text of § 1692f(8) is unequivocal.  “[A]ny 
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language or symbol,” except the debt collector’s address and, 
in some cases, business name, may not be included “on any 
envelope.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8).  The plain language of § 
1692f(8) does not permit Convergent’s envelope to display an 
account number.  Because the statute’s language is plain, our 
sole function is “to enforce it according to its terms,” so long 
as “the disposition required by that [text] is not absurd.”  
Alston v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 585 F.3d 753, 759 (3d Cir. 
2009) (quoting Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004)). 
 
 Convergent does not dispute that the plain language of 
§ 1692f(8) prohibits including Douglass’s account number on 
the face of the envelope.  Rather, Convergent contends that a 
literal application of the statute creates an absurdity.  If the 
statute is interpreted to bar any language other than a debt 
collector’s name and address, the argument follows, then no 
debt collector could ever send a letter through the mail—the 
envelope could not display the name and address of the 
recipient or even a stamp without violating the FDCPA.  
Convergent suggests such an interpretation cannot possibly 
reflect Congress’s intent.  Accordingly, Convergent maintains 
that to prevent absurd results we must adopt a “benign 
language” exception to the FDCPA that would allow for 
markings on an envelope so long as they do not suggest the 
letter’s purpose of debt collection or humiliate or threaten the 
debtor. 
 
 We need not decide whether § 1692f(8) contains a 
benign language exception because even if such an exception 
existed, Douglass’s account number is not benign.  While 
courts may presume Congress intended an exception to a 
statute that otherwise produces absurd results, see Berry, 604 
F.2d at 225, the contours of such an exception must comport 
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with the purposes of the Act, Caprio, 709 F.3d at 148; see 
also Peter v. GC Servs. L.P., 310 F.3d 344, 352 (5th Cir. 
2002) (holding that an exception for benign language could 
not be “stretched to cover” conduct by a debt collector 
implicating a “core concern of the FDCPA”).  In other words, 
we cannot find language exempt from  
§ 1692f(8) if its disclosure on an envelope would run counter 
to the very reasons Congress enacted the FDCPA. 
 
 Here, Convergent’s disclosure implicates a core 
concern animating the FDCPA—the invasion of privacy.  
Section 1692(a) of the FDCPA explains that Congress 
enacted the law in response to “abundant evidence” of 
abusive debt collection practices that cause manifest harms to 
individuals, among them “invasions of individual privacy.”  
15 U.S.C. § 1692(a).  The disclosure of Douglass’s account 
number raises these privacy concerns.  The account number is 
a core piece of information pertaining to Douglass’s status as 
a debtor and Convergent’s debt collection effort.  Disclosed 
to the public, it could be used to expose her financial 
predicament.  Because Convergent’s disclosure implicates 
core privacy concerns, it cannot be deemed benign. 
 
 Though several courts, including the Courts of 
Appeals for the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, have interpreted § 
1692f(8) to permit an exception for certain benign or 
innocuous markings, they did so in the context of envelope 
markings that did not have the potential to cause invasions of 
privacy.  In Goswami v. American Collections Enterprise, 
Inc., 377 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 2004), the Fifth Circuit held the 
marking “priority letter” on the face of an envelope did not 
violate the FDCPA.  Because the Fifth Circuit found  
§ 1692f(8) ambiguous, it looked to the statute’s legislative 
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history and interpretation by the FTC to determine Congress’s 
intent.  Id. at 493-94.  It considered the FTC’s interpretation 
of the statute persuasive because it exempts a category of 
“harmless words or symbols” from § 1692f(8)’s reach.  Id. at 
494 (quoting FTC Statements of General Policy or 
Interpretation Staff Commentary On the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (hereinafter “FTC Staff Commentary”), 53 Fed. 
Reg. 50,097-02, 50,108 (Dec. 13, 1988)).
5
  In addition, the 
court referred to Senate Report 95-382, which explains the 
Senate’s interpretation of the FDCPA bill and describes § 
1692f(8) as prohibiting “symbols on envelopes indicating that 
the contents pertain to debt collection.”  Id. (quoting S. Rep. 
No. 95-382, at 8 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1695, 1702) (emphasis added).  In light of these sources, the 
Fifth Circuit concluded that Congress meant to exclude 
innocuous markings from § 1692f(8)’s prohibition.  Id. at 
494. 
 
 The Eighth Circuit adopted a similar statutory 
exception in Strand v. Diversified Collection Service, Inc., 
380 F.3d 316 (8th Cir. 2004).  In Strand, the Eighth Circuit 
was asked to determine whether markings on an envelope 
reading “PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL” and 
“IMMEDIATE REPLY REQUESTED,” as well as a 
corporate logo, violated the FDCPA.  Id. at 317.  The court 
                                              
5
 The FTC Staff Commentary is not a formal regulation and is 
not binding.  FTC Staff Commentary, 53 Fed. Reg. at 50,098 
(stating the commentary does not have the force of “formal 
agency action” and “is not binding on the Commission or the 
public”); see also Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 298 (1995) 
(declining to give conclusive weight to the FTC’s 
interpretation of the FDCPA). 
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reasoned that the plain meaning of  
§ 1692f(8) created “bizarre results” and therefore referred to 
other sources to discern Congress’s intent.  Id. at 318.  
Relying on the FDCPA’s stated purpose, the legislative 
history, and the FTC Staff Commentary, the Eighth Circuit 
concluded that in enacting  
§ 1692f(8) Congress intended to proscribe only those 
markings that would reveal the contents of the letter to pertain 
to debt collection.  Id. at 318-19.  Benign markings were 
therefore exempt.  Id. at 319.
6
 
 
 The disclosures in Goswami and Strand do not raise 
the privacy concerns present in this case.  The “priority letter” 
marking in Goswami revealed no information about the 
debtor.  377 F.3d at 494.  Nor did the corporate logo and 
markings reading “PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL” 
and “IMMEDIATE REPLY REQUESTED” in Strand.  380 
F.3d at 319.  The Fifth and Eighth Circuits found these 
markings innocuous because they did not intimate the 
                                              
6
 Several district courts have adopted benign language 
exceptions similar to those crafted by the courts in Goswami 
and Strand.  Waldron v. Prof’l Med. Mgmt., Civ. No. 12-
1863, 2013 WL 978933, at *3-6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2013) 
(finding a QR code met a benign language exception to § 
1692f(8)); Johnson v. NCB Collection Servs., 799 F. Supp. 
1298, 1305 (D. Conn. 1992) (holding § 1692f(8) permits the 
display of benign language, including the label “Revenue 
Department,” on an envelope); Masuda v. Thomas Richards 
& Co., 759 F. Supp. 1456, 1466 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (adopting a 
benign language exception and applying it to language on an 
envelope reading “PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL” and 
“Forwarding and Address Correction Requested”). 
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contents of the letters to pertain to debt collection.  Strand, 
380 F.3d at 319; Goswami, 377 F.3d at 494; see also Johnson, 
799 F. Supp. at 1305 (holding the label “Revenue 
Department” was an innocuous marking not prohibited by § 
1692f(8)); Masuda, 759 F. Supp. at 1466 (finding no FDCPA 
violation where an envelope contained language reading 
“PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL” and “Forwarding and 
Address Correction Requested”).  But these courts did not 
confront an envelope that displayed core information relating 
to the debt collection and susceptible to privacy intrusions.  
For this reason, the cases cited by Convergent are inapposite. 
 
  Neither Senate Report 95-382 nor the FTC Staff 
Commentary supports an exception to  § 1692f(8) that would 
exempt the identifying information in this case.  The Senate 
Report lists specific practices that § 1692f would prohibit: 
 
collecting amounts in excess of the debt or 
interest owed; causing charges  for 
communications to be billed to a consumer; 
repossessing property if  there is no valid 
security interest or if it is exempt by law from 
repossession; communicating information about 
a debt by postcard; and  using symbols on 
envelopes indicating that the contents pertain to 
debt  collection. 
S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 8.  But this list does not purport to be 
complete, and the Report makes no mention of the sort of 
debtor-identifying information at issue in this case.  Absent a 
more relevant statement regarding the presence of personal 
data on debt collection envelopes, this legislative history does 
not support a construction of  
14 
 
§ 1692f(8) that would permit the disclosure of information 
implicating a core concern of the FDCPA. 
 The FTC Staff Commentary is likewise unpersuasive.
7
  
The FTC interprets 
§ 1692f(8) to permit the presence on an envelope of 
“harmless words or symbols” and lists examples of harmless 
markings—a Western Union logo, the label “telegram,” or the 
word “Personal” or “Confidential.”  FTC Staff Commentary, 
53 Fed. Reg. at 50,108.  But like Senate Report 95-382, the 
FTC Staff Commentary does not address markings that have 
the potential to identify the debtor and her debt.  Moreover, 
the examples offered by the FTC, which are similar to those 
addressed in Goswami and Strand, bear no relation to the 
disclosure in this case. 
 
  Convergent insists that Douglass’s account number is a 
meaningless string of numbers and letters, and its disclosure 
has not harmed and could not possibly harm  Douglass.
8
  But 
                                              
7
 As noted above, the FTC’s interpretation is not a formal rule 
entitled to some deference.  It is at most persuasive, 
nonbinding authority.  Goswami, 377 F.3d at 493 n.1. 
8
 Douglass seeks only statutory damages.  See Weiss v. Regal 
Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 340 (3d Cir. 2004) (recognizing a 
private action under the FDCPA can seek relief in the form of 
actual damages sustained or “such additional damages as the 
court may allow” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a))).  
Convergent contends that if we find a violation of the FDCPA 
in this case, Douglass is not entitled to those damages because 
Convergent’s disclosure was at most a technical breach.  We 
do not decide this matter because it is for the District Court to 
determine in the first instance, based on the relevant factors 
set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b).  See 15 U.S.C. § 
15 
 
the account number is not meaningless—it is a piece of 
information capable of identifying Douglass as a debtor.  And 
its disclosure has the potential to cause harm to a consumer 
that the FDCPA was enacted to address.  As we have stated 
before, the FDCPA “must be broadly construed in order to 
give full effect to [Congress’s remedial] purposes.”  Caprio, 
709 F.3d at 148.  Construing § 1692f(8) in accord with the 
FDCPA’s purposes in § 1692(a), we find the statute not only 
proscribes potentially harassing and embarrassing language, 
but also protects consumers’ identifying information.  
Accordingly, Douglass’s account number is impermissible 
language or symbols under § 1692f(8).
9
 
 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order granting summary judgment to Convergent and 
remand for further proceedings in accordance with this 
opinion. 
                                                                                                     
1692k(b)(2) (listing factors to consider in the damages 
determination, including “the frequency and persistence of 
noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such 
noncompliance, the resources of the debt collector, the 
number of persons adversely affected, and the extent to which 
the debt collector’s noncompliance was intentional”).   
9
 We recognize that 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8) should not be read 
to create absurd results.  But we believe the disclosure of 
private information in this case is proscribed by the Act.  We 
express no opinion as to the benign language exception that 
some courts have adopted. 
